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THIRD-PARTY-BENEFICIARY CONTRACTS
There are times when two contracting parties intend for their agree-
ment to benefit a third party. The third party is known as the beneficiary
of the contract. Of the two contracting parties, one is the stipulator
and the other the promisor. The stipulator instructs the promisor to
render some performance to the beneficiary and the promisor agrees to
do so. This is the basic format for a third-party-beneficiary contract,
the stipulation pour autrui.' A simple example is where A (stipulator)
sells B (promisor) a car and directs B to pay C (beneficiary) (example
1).
Third-party-beneficiary contracts are an exception to the general rule
that contracts have effect only between the contracting parties.2 In order
to justify this exception, there must be some sort of relationship between
the stipulator and the beneficiary. There could be a legal relationship
where the stipulator owes an obligation to the beneficiary and perform-
ance of the stipulation by the promisor will discharge it. A factual
relationship where the promisor's performance will protect the stipulator
from future liability toward the beneficiary would also suffice as would
ties of kinship or other indications that a gratuity was intended.3
The Louisiana Digest of 1808 dealt with the stipulation pour autrui
in a single article:
A person may, in like manner, stipulate for the advantage of
a third person, when such is the condition of a stipulation that
he makes for himself, or of a donation that he makes to another.
He who has made such a stipulation, can no longer revoke
it, if the third person has declared himself willing to avail himself
of it.4
The wording of this article was changed in the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1825 to read:
A person may also, in his own name, make some advantage
for a third person the condition or consideration of a com-
mutative contract, or onerous donation; and if such.third person
Copyright 1985, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Articles 1756-2291 of the Louisiana Civil Code of 1870 [hereinafter cited as OA
(old articles)] were abrogated and replaced by new articles 1756-2057 [hereinafter cited as
NA]; see 1984 La. Acts, No. 331, § 1.
2. See Carl Heck Eng'rs, Inc. v. Haselden & Assocs., Inc., 316 So. 2d 890, 894
(La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied, 320 So. 2d 912 (La. 1975).
3. Smith, Third Party Beneficiaries In Louisiana: The Stipulation Pour Autrui, 11
Tul. L. Rev. 18, 58 (1936).
4. La. Digest of 1808 bk. III, tit. III, art. 21.
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consents to avail himself of the advantage stipulated in his favor,
the contract can not be revoked.'
Article 1896 was added at this time:
But a contract, in which anything is stipulated for the benefit
of a third person, who has signified his assent to accept it, can
not be revoked as to the advantage stipulated in his favor,
without his consent. 6
These articles remained unchanged until the revision of 1984. 7
To determine what changes, if any, have been made by the 1984
revision, it will be necessary to follow the jurisprudential development
of articles 1890 and 1902 of the Civil Code of 1825. A comparison can
then be made between the law as it stood prior to the revision and the
new articles.
NA 1978: Stipulation for a third party
A contracting party may stipulate a benefit for a third person
called a third party beneficiary.
Once the third party has manifested his intention to avail himself
of the benefit, the parties may not dissolve the contract by mutual
consent without the beneficiary's agreement.
The "Commutative" Requirement
Though the reporter states that NA 1978 reproduces OA 1890 and
1902, 9 this is misleading since NA 1978 eliminates the statement that a
stipulation for another can be the condition or consideration of only a
commutative contract. Formerly, a commutative contract was one in
which one party's performance was considered equivalent to that of the
other.' 0 Independent contracts were those in which the parties' perform-
ances had no relation to each other," and they were not included in
OA 1890. Bilateral contracts were presumed to be commutative unless
the contrary was expressed, 2 thus making them independent.
An example of an independent contract containing a stipulation for
another would be where A (stipulator) transfers a house to B (promisor)
in consideration for B's taking care of A's mother for the rest of her
life, and the parties state that the performances are not to be considered
equivalents. Under OA 1890 this stipulation could not have been the
5. La. Civ. Code art. 1884 (1825).
6. La. Civ. Code art. 1896 (1825).
7. 1984 La. Acts, No. 331, § 1.
8. NA 1978.
9. NA 1978, comment (a).
10. La. Civ. Code art. 1768 (1870).
11. La. Civ. Code art. 1769 (1870).
12. La. Civ. Code art. 1770 (1870).
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condition or consideration for A's transfer of the house since the contract
is not commutative 3 (example 2).
As early as 1846, in Watt v. Rice,' 4 the Louisiana Supreme Court
recognized that an advantage stipulated for another is sufficient con-
sideration for a contract. The court did not limit the application of this
rule to commutative contracts. The equivalency of the objects was not
at issue, however, and the contract should have been presumed to have
been commutative, for the parties had not expressed any contrary in-
tention. In light of these circumstances, this decision probably was not
an attempt by the court to sidestep the "commutative" requirement in
OA 1890. This writer has found no case involving an independent
contract that contained a stipulation for another. The clear wording of
the statute, which excludes independent contracts, must be compared
with the new article to determine whether there are any changes.
The requirement that the obligation between the stipulator and prom-
isor be a commutative contract has been removed from NA 1978. Now
a party to any contract can stipulate for another. Also, OA 1769 has
been eliminated; hence there is no longer a classification of independent
contracts, nor is there a reference to equivalents. 5 The contract is now
to be considered commutative if the parties' promises are reciprocally
dependent.'
6
In the past, stipulation for another could not support an independent
contract like the agreement in example 2; today, however, it could
support that agreement. We would no longer call this an independent
contract: it would be commutative since the promises were reciprocally
dependent. Hence there has been a change in the law, contrary to what
is indicated in the comments to NA 1978.17
The "Onerous Donation" Requirement
According to OA 1890, a stipulation for another could be the condition
or consideration for only an onerous donation. A donation can be either
gratuitous, onerous, or remunerative,'" and an onerous donation is de-
fined as "that which is burdened with charges imposed on the donee."
Since NA 1978 no longer requires a donation to be onerous, if a
stipulation for another can be a condition or consideration for a gra-
tuitous or remunerative donation, there will be a change in the law.
13. This agreement could not be considered an onerous donation if each party
bargained for the other's performance. 1 S. Litvinoff, Obligations § 103, at 180-81, in
6 Louisiana Civil Law Treatise (1969).
14. 1 La. Ann. 280 (1846).
15. NA 1911.
16. Id.
17. NA 1978, comment (a).
18. La. Civ. Code art. 1523.
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However, the Louisiana Supreme Court, in Thompson v. Societe Cath-
olique D'Education Religieuse et Litteraire, said "the charge or burden,
to make the donation an onerous one, need not be one in favor of the
donor, but it may be one in favor of a third person ... ."9 Thus,
all donations with stipulations for third persons as charges on them are
onerous donations. Today, therefore, if a person attaches a stipulation
for another to a donation, that donation will be classified as onerous
under the Thompson doctrine. This conforms to OA 1890's requirement
that the donation be onerous, so there is no change in this aspect of
the law.
"Acceptance" by the Beneficiary
The acceptance by the third party is not an acceptance of an offer
made to him; rather, it is a ratification of an agreement made in his
favor.2 0 As a result, the beneficiary need not have contractual capacity
at the time the contract between the stipulator and promisor was made,
but only at the time he manifests his intent to avail himself of the
benefit. 21 Also, the beneficiary's right comes into existence the moment
the contract is formed between the stipulator and the promisor, so the
beneficiary or his heirs can accept the benefit even after the death of
the stipulator. 22
There appears to be no practical difference between a beneficiary's
consenting to avail himself of the advantage, as required in OA 1890,
and the requirement in NA 1978 that he manifest an intention to avail
himself of the advantage. Perhaps the change in wording was intended
to prevent the inadvertant application of the rules of offer and acceptance
to the assent by the beneficiary. 23 The jurisprudence shows that ac-
ceptance by the beneficiary does not have to be express but can be
implied by actions of the beneficiary.2 4 The courts have recognized some
19. Thompson v. Societe Catholique D'Education Religieuse Et Litteraire, 157 La.
875, 882, 103 So. 247, 249 (1924) (on reh'g). Chief Justice O'Neill dissented, arguing
that a donation containing a stipulation for a third party could be gratuitous. Thompson,
157 La. at 887, 103 So. at 251 (O'Neill, C.J., dissenting).
20. 2 M. Planiol, Treatise on the Civil Law pt. 1, no. 1251 (11th ed. La. St. L.
Inst. trans. 1959); see also NA 1843, which states in part: "Ratification is a declaration
whereby a person gives his consent to an obligation incurred on his behalf by another
without authority." But see Cox v. W.R. Aldrich & Co., 247 La. 797, 174 So. 2d 634
(1965), where the court seemed to apply the rules of offer and acceptance to a third
party's attempt to say he had consented to avail himself of the benefit stipulated in his
favor.
21. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1252.
22. Id.
23. See Cox v. W.R. Aldrick & Co., 247 La. 797, 174 So. 2d 634 (1965).
24. See, e.g., Andrepont v. Acadia Drilling Co., 255 La. 347, 231 So. 2d 347 (1969)
(on reh'g).
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actions by the beneficiary as an implied acceptance, for example: (1)
the beneficiary drills a well in reliance on the stipulation; 25 (2) the
beneficiary sells property to the stipulator who, in selling it to the
promisor, instructed him to pay the beneficiary; the beneficiary accepts
the benefit when he acquiesces in the promisor's use of the property; 26
(3) the beneficiary uses a servitude that was established by a stipulation
in his favor; 27 (4) the beneficiary notifies the promisor that the debt
stipulated in the beneficiary's favor is due. 28 The beneficiary's consent
in each case is a manifestation of his intent to avail himself of the
benefit; thus, it would also conform to the requirement in NA 1978.
In order to manifest an intent to accept a benefit, the beneficiary
would have to be aware of the benefit. Silence could be a manifestation
of an intent to avail oneself of a benefit.2 9 However, silence by the
beneficiary when he has no knowledge of the benefit stipulated in his
favor should not qualify as a manifestation of an intent under NA 1978.
The Louisiana Fourth Circuit Court of Appeal said that silence without
knowledge would qualify as implied acceptance under OA 1890 in Fi-
delity-Phenix Fire Insurance v. Forest Oil Corp.30 The court's language
should be considered dicta, however, for it gave another justification
for the holding. Common sense dictates a conclusion contrary to the
wording used by the Fourth Circuit.3 ' Acceptance is a responsive act. If
the stiupulation is unknown to the beneficiary it is inconceivable that
his actions are in response to the stipulation.
Dissolution of the Contract Before Acceptance by the Beneficiary
Prior law indicated that once the beneficiary "consents to avail himself
of the advantage . . . the contract can not be revoked." '3 2 Before the
beneficiary accepted the benefit, the parties should have been free to
revoke the contract,33 but once the beneficiary accepted the benefit the
parties were bound by the stipulation and could no longer revoke the
25. First State Bank v. Burton, 225 La. 537, 73 So. 2d 453 (1954).
26. Muntz v. Algiers & G. Ry., 114 La. 437, 38 So. 410 (1905).
27. Mallet v. Thibault, 212 La. 79, 31 So. 2d 601 (1947).
28. Bryant v. Stothart, 46 La. Ann. 485, 15 So. 76 (1894).
29. See NA 1942.
30. 141 So. 2d 841, 847 (1962).
31. The court was not sure that the contract in question contained a stipulation pour
autrui but stated that if it did and an acceptance was necessary, the defendant's silence
was an implied acceptance whether the defendant knew of the stipulation or not. The
court cited no authority and gave no justifications for its conclusion.
32. La. Civ. Code art. 1890 (1870).
33. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1247.
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contract.34 There apparently has been no case where a beneficiary pre-
vented a voluntary dissolution between the stipulator and the promisor.
However, in Bryant v. Stothart" where one party to the contract sued
the other for dissolution, the courts still did not grant it: the beneficiary
had accepted, and the contract could no longer be dissolved. An
example of this situation is where A (stipulator) sells B (promisor) a
car for $1000 and instructs B to pay A $400 and to pay C (beneficiary)
$600. If B does not pay A the $400, A can sue B to dissolve the
contract only if C has not yet accepted the benefit (example 3).
NA 1979: Revocation
The stipulation may be revoked only by the stipulator and only
before the third party has manifested his intention of availing
himself of the benefit.
If the promisor has an interest in performing, however, the
stipulation may not be revoked without his consent.
3 6
When May the Stipulation Be Revoked?
We have seen that a contract cannot be dissolved by the contracting
parties after the beneficiary accepts the benefit. NA 1979 extends this
same concept to the stipulation within the contract. Thus, if A (stip-
ulator) makes a donation to B (promisor) with a stipulation that part
of it be used to pay C's (beneficiary) college education, and A and C
later have a disagreement, A can revoke the stipulation (not the do-
nation) 7 only if C has not yet manifested his intention to avail himself
of it (example 4).
An example of this principle is given in Cox v. W.R. Aldrich & Co.38
The Louisiana Department of Highways (stipulator) contracted with the
defendant construction company (promisor) to widen a highway. As part
of their performance, the construction company agreed to remove part
of a building belonging to the plaintiff (beneficiary). 9 Prior to an
34. Capital Loans, Inc. v. Stassi, 195 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir.), cert. denied,
250 La. 889, 199 So. 2d 912 (1967); Tilley v. Camden Fire Ins. Ass'n, 139 La. 985, 72
So. 709 (1916); Pecquet v. Pecquet's Ex'r, 17 La. Ann. 204 (1865); Sargeant v. Daunoy,
14 La. 43 (1839).
35. 46 La. Ann. 485, 15 So. 76 (1894).
36. NA 1979.
37. The donation still stands but B now has to give to A the part of the donation
that prior to the revocation, he was bound to give to C. See NA 1980.
38. 247 La. 797,. 174 So. 2d 634 (1965).
39. The highway department had agreed to remove part of the building to induce
the plaintiff to agree to sell the highway department the land it needed to widen the
road. This agreement was a separate matter and was not dealt with in the opinion.
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acceptance by the beneficiary the highway department and the construc-
tion company excised the stipulation from the contract. The Louisiana
Supreme Court stated on rehearing that the beneficiary had not accepted
the benefit and the contracting parties were permitted to delete the
stipulation from the contract.
Justice Sanders concurred in this result but recognized that this contract
contained a provision allowing the highway department to eliminate
certain obligations the construction company was to perform, including
work on the plaintiff's building. From this he reasoned that the parties
could revoke the stipulation whether or not, the beneficiary had ac-
cepted, 40 since the beneficiary acquires the benefit subject to any con-
ditions attached to it.41 Justice Sanders cited Alba v. Provident Savings
Life Assurance Society42 in support of this principle. In Alba the pur-
chaser of a life insurance policy reserved the right to change the ben-
eficiary. The court said the beneficiary enjoys the benefit stipulated in
his favor only as long as the insured (stipulator) does not change the
designated beneficiary. Acceptance of the benefit by the beneficiary
would not prevent the insured from changing the beneficiary of the
policy since the beneficiary can have no vested interest in the policy
during the lifetime of the insured.4 3
The naming of beneficiaries in life insurance policies was removed
from the purview of the Louisiana Civil Code by Act 292 of 1940. 44
Thus, the articles on third-party-beneficiary contracts no longer apply
to these contracts and the validity of a change in the beneficiary of a
life insurance policy depends on the wording of the policy.45 Nevertheless,
Justice Sanders's argument is still plausible, even without the support
of the insurance cases, because the stipulator has bound himself to do
only what he has promised. If his promise is limited by certain conditions,
the beneficiary receives the benefit subject to these conditions. 46 Thus,
it is clear that a stipulation is subject to revocation prior to "acceptance"
by the beneficiary and it may be subject to revocation after the ben-
eficiary has accepted if the stipulator provides for such revocation.
Who May Revoke the Stipulation?
The Louisiana Supreme Court has stated that if both the stipulator
and the promisor have an interest in performing the stipulation, there
40. Cox, 247 La. at 817, 174 So. 2d at 641 (Sanders, J., concurring).
41. See also 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1247; Smith, supra note 3, at
56-57.
42. 118 La. 1021, 43 So. 663 (1907).
43. Pollock v. Pollock, 164 La. 1077, 115 So. 275 (1927).
44. 1940 Acts, No. 292 §§ 1, 2; see also La. R.S. 22:1521 (1978).
45. NA 1979, comment (c).
46. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1247; Smith, supra note 3, at 56-57.
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can be no revocation of that stipulation without their mutual consent.4 7
This is in accord with the second paragraph of NA 1979.
The principle found in NA 1979 that only the stipulator can revoke
the stipulation before its "acceptance" when the promisor has no interest
in performing has its background in French law. 48 Professor J. Denson
Smith, in his article on third-party-beneficiary contracts, 49 indicated that
the revocation of a stipulation for a third party's benefit is a change
in the terms of the contract that requires the consent of both contracting
parties.5 0 But the stipulation is only a condition to or charge on the
contract. Therefore, the stipulator, as the party who imposed the con-
dition or charge, should be allowed to remove it by his will alone, for
the promisor was only bound to fulfill the condition or carry out the
charge.5
The courts have not yet decided a case where the stipulator attempted
to revoke a stipulation without the promisor's consent. If the problem
had been presented, the courts would have been faced with deciding
between the opposing views of Professor Smith and the French jurists.
The 1984 revision clarifies the law on this matter by giving the stipulator
the sole power to revoke the stipulation, before acceptance by the
beneficiary, when the promisor has no interest in performing. 2 The
Digest of 1808 declared that "[hie who has made such a stipulation,
can no longer revoke it, if the third person has declared himself willing
to avail himself of it."" The wording indicated that the stipulator alone
could revoke the stipulation. Thus, the drafters of the Digest seem to
have intended to follow the French doctrine. The clear wording of this
article in the Digest was changed in article 1896 of the Civil Code of
1825 to state: "But a contract . . . cannot be revoked as to the advantage
stipulated. . .. -"4 This phrasing is ambiguous as to who may revoke
the advantage stipulated. The word revoke means "take back" or "re-
call" and since the stipulator was the proposer of the stipulation, it is
only he who can "take it back"; the promisor cannot "take back"
something that was proposed to him. Therefore, the use of the word
47. A. Bonnafe & Co. v. Lane, 5 La. Ann. 225, 229 (1850).
48. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1248.
49. Smith, supra note 3, at 18.
50. Id. at 55-56.
51. See 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1248, which states in part: "In
principle, the right of revocation belongs to the stipulator only: it was he who took the
initative for the stipulation; it is he who is interested in the third person, for whom he
acts." See also 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, Droit Civil Francais § 343 (b), at 324 (E. Bartin
6th ed. 1965), in I Civil Law Translations (La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1965), which states
that the stipulation may "be revoked by the stipulant without the consent of the promisor."
52. NA 1979.
53. La. Digest of 1808 bk. III, tit. Ill, art. 21.
54. La. Civ. Code art. 1896 (1825).
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"revoked" in article 1896 was sufficient to retain the principle expressed
in the Digest.
It is evident, therefore, that NA 1979 does not change the law as it
relates to the stipulator's having sole authority to revoke the stipulation
when the promisor has no interest in performing.
NA 1980: Revocation or Refusal
In case of revocation or refusal of the stipulation, the promisor
shall render performance to the stipulator.5
Prior to the 1984 revision, the effect of a revocation or refusal of
the stipulation on the obligation of the promisor was unclear. The
promisor was necessarily either relieved of his obligation to perform or
owed the performance to the stipulator in place of the beneficiary.
Planiol believed it was impossible to formulate a general rule that covered
all situations and therefore argued that the courts should look to the
intent of the parties to determine whether the promisor owed the per-
formance to the stipulator or was relieved of his obligation.16 Aubry
and Rau thought a revocation gave the stipulator the right to demand
that the performance be rendered to himself, unless it was of such a
nature that it could not be transferred from the beneficiary to the
stipulator, in which case the promisor necessarily benefitted from the
revocation.57
Refusal of the Stipulation
Louisiana courts have recognized that when the stipulation is not
accepted by the beneficiary, the promisor owes performance to the
stipulator. 8 In Martin v. Dickson, a lessor stipulated that the lessee was
to pay part of the rent to a third person. The beneficiary never accepted
the benefit, and an assignee of the lessor sued the lessee for the amount
stipulated to be paid to the third party. The court indicated that absent
other circumstances, the assignee would have been entitled to recover.5 9
The non-acceptance by the beneficiary did not end the promisor's ob-
ligation to perform that part of the agreement; rather, the promisor
owed performance to the stipulator instead of the beneficiary.
In the future, when the beneficiary does not accept the benefit or
refuses it, the courts will have a clear guideline to follow in NA 1980-
55. NA 1980.
56. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1249.
57. 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra note 51, § 343(b), at 324.
58. Martin v. Dickson, 35 La. Ann. 1036 (1883).
59. Id. at 1038.
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an improvement since OA 1890 and 1902 provided no guidelines.
Revocation of the Stipulation
NA 1980 makes no distinction between a revocation by the stipulator
alone and one that requires the promisor's consent. If the revocation
requires the promisor's consent, he cannot be forced to render per-
formance to the stipulator against his will. By refusing to consent to
the revocation, the promisor can protect himself from being forced to
render performance to a party other than the one to which he agreed.
No similar protection exists if the benefit can be revoked by the stipulator
alone. The promisor may be required to render performance to the
stipulator, a party to whom he did not intend to render performance.
An example would be where A (stipulator/publisher of a magazine) pays
$100 to B (promisor) for photographs of his girlfriend, who has recently
won a beauty pageant, and stipulates that B is to give them to C
(beneficiary/famous art gallery). When A revokes the stipulation before
C accepts, B may not want to deliver the photographs to A (example
5).
Professor Smith said such a change in terms should require consent
from both parties. 60 One way the courts could approach this situation
is to give the term interest in NA 1979 a broad interpretation to include
instances where the party (to whom performance is due) is a principal
cause in the promisor's agreeing to contract. If this approach were
taken, the revocation of the stipulation would require the promisor's
consent. However, this approach would burden the courts, since lengthy
inquiries into the intent of the parties would be required. Using this
subjective approach, a court would probably not force B to deliver the
photographs to A in example 5.
Another solution would be to hold the promisor to the knowledge
that when he enters a third-party-beneficiary contract he may be required
to render performance to the stipulator. Thus, the contract would include
a tacit agreement on the part of the promisor to render performance
to the stipulator if the benefit is revoked or refused. Using this approach,
B would be forced to deliver the photographs to A in example 5.
However, contracting parties are simply not going to consider these
articles when contracting. Thus, holding a party to this knowledge would
be unfair and would frequently force the courts to decide cases against
their better judgment.
Is the Rule in NA 1980 Absolute?
The use of the words shall in NA 1980 and must in comment (b) to
60. J. Smith, supra note 3, at 56.
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that article indicates the strong intent that this is as close to being an
absolute rule as is possible. The wording permits no exceptions. Yet,
the French commentators say that the nature of third-party-beneficiary
contracts is such that exceptions are inherent in them. One exception
occurs when the stipulation is of such a nature that it cannot be
transferred from the beneficiary to the stipulator. For example, A (stip-
ulator), who lives in an apartment and does not own a house, pays
$100 to B (promisor) and stipulates that he paint C's (beneficiary/A's
mother) house (example 6). If the third party, C, refuses the benefit,
it is obvious that B cannot paint A's house. How will the courts deal
with such a situation in light of the absolute rule in NA 1980? If the
stipulation cannot be transferred, it would be impossible for the promisor
to render performance to the stipulator. Since a contract is null when
its object is impossible, 61 a contract should be null when the stipulation
is revoked or refused and is incapable of being transferred from the
beneficiary to the stipulator.
The theory of cause may also be used to explain the necessity of an
exception to the strict application of NA 1980. This is in conformity
with Planiol's observation that it is necessary to look to the intent of
the parties to determine whether the promisor must render performance
of the revoked or refused benefit to the stipulator. 62 For example, A
(stipulator), while installing cable television in the home of C (benefi-
ciary), accidentally destroys a portrait of C's grandmother. To prevent
or limit future liability, A hires B (promisor) to repaint the portrait for
C. If C refuses the stipulated benefit before B begins painting and A
informs B he no longer desires the portrait to be painted, the courts
should not force A to accept a painting of C's grandmother (example
7). The cause of A's contracting was not to receive the portrait, but
to prevent future liability; 63 therefore, the contract should fail due to
failure of cause, 64 and NA 1980 would not apply.
The exceptions proposed by examples 6 and 7 to NA 1980's absolute
rule are situations where the obligation is rendered null by other pro-
visions of the Civil Code. The drafters undoubtedly recognized the
possibility that the promisor would not be able to render the performance
to the stipulator and the possibility that one or both parties did not
intend for the promisor to render performance to the stipulator if the
benefit was refused or revoked. Thus, NA 1980 should be read as an
absolute rule unless the contract is nullified by other provisions of the
Civil Code.
61. NA 1972.
62. NA 1980.
63. NA 1967.
64. See NA 1966.
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NA 1981: Rights of Beneficiary and Stipulator
The Stipulation gives the third party beneficiary the right to
demand performance from the promisor.
Also the stipulator, for the benefit of the third party, may
demand performance from the promisor."
The Beneficiary's Right to Demand Performance
The third-party-beneficiary is not a party to the contract between the
stipulator and the promisor. The Louisiana jurisprudence is clear that
one cannot complain of the conditions or non-execution of a contract
to which he is not a party.66 The maxim that "[a] thing done between
some can neither harm nor profit others ' 67 aptly states this principle.
This is a general rule, however, and the courts have recognized an
exception in third-party-beneficiary contracts. It is clear that our courts
allow the third-party-beneficiary to bring an action on the contract to
enforce the stipulation if he does so before it is revoked. 68 This rule is
deeply rooted in our jurisprudence and dates back to 1818.69
That the beneficiary can sue the promisor as a result of the third-
party-beneficiary contract in no way diminishes his right of action against
the stipulator when the beneficiary is a creditor of the stipulator. The
acceptance of the contract benefit is not a novation of the debt the
stipulator may owe the beneficiary. 70 A stipulation for the benefit of a
third person has the effect of giving the beneficiary an additional cred-
itor-the promisor. 7'
The Stipulator's Right to Demand Performance
The stipulator either owes the beneficiary something, may have some
future liability to him, or intends to confer a gratituity toward him. In
these instances the stipulator has a keen interest in the promisor's
performing. Thus, the stipulator should be allowed to demand that the
promisor render the performance to the beneficiary. The stipulator is a
party to the contract and has standing to demand performance from
his co-contractant. It is important to realize that, though the stipulator
65. NA 1981.
66. See, e.g., State v. Simoni, Heck & Assocs., 331 So. 2d 478 (La. 1976); Police
Jury v. Alexandria Gravel Co., 146 La. 1, 83 So. 316 (1919); Schwartz v. Thirty Two
Flatboats, 14 La. Ann. 243 (1859).
67. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1172.
68. See, e.g., New Orleans St. Joseph's Ass'n v. Magnier, 16 La. Ann. 338, 339
(1861).
69. Mayor v. Bailey, 5 Mart. (o.s.) 321 (La. 1818).
70. See NA 1882 & comment (c).
71. First State Bank v. Burton, 225 La. 537, 73 So. 2d 453 (1954).
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can demand performance only for the third party's benefit, he should
still be entitled to claim damages for himself, if any should result from
the promisor's non-performance. 72
A literal reading of NA 1981 gives the stipulator and beneficiary
independent rights to demand performance. If one demands performance
and loses, is the decision res judicata for the other? The wording of
the article indicates that the stipulator and the beneficiary have separate
rights of action and need not join each other's suit as plaintiffs. To
avoid the possibility of having to litigate the matter twice, the defendant
should be able to compel the joinder of the stipulator and beneficiary
as indispensable parties. 73 If one demands performance and loses, the
judgment should not be res judicata for the other because there is no
identity of the parties. 74 They stand in different capacities toward the
promisor.
NA 1982: Defense of the promisor
The promisor may raise against the beneficiary such defenses
based on the contract as he may have raised against the
stipulator. 75
The cause for the promisor's binding himself to render some per-
formance to the beneficiary is usually to obtain the performance the
stipulator agrees to render him. If the stipulator does not perform, the
promisor has no cause to render performance to the beneficiary. For
example, A (stipulator) buys a car from B (promisor) and instructs him
to deliver it to C (beneficiary) in sixty days. After C accepts, A defaults
on his note to B before making any payments. On the sixtieth day B
does not have to deliver the car to C (example 8).
The courts recognized this reasoning in Union Bank v. Bowman. 76
The defendant had promised his vendor that he would pay the remainder
of the vendor's note to the plaintiff in partial consideration for the
purchase of some land and stock. The court held that the defendant
(promisor) was not personally liable for the note because the vendor
(stipulator) had not been able to deliver all of the land. Since the validity
of the stipulation depends on the validity of the contract in which it
is contained, it follows that any defenses the promisor has that would
72. See 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1258; 4 C. Aubry & C. Rau, supra
note 51, § 343(b), at 323.
73. See La. Code Civ. P. arts. 641-642; see also NA 2044 & comment (c) (stating
that when the stipulator is a debtor of the beneficiary irrespective of the third party
beneficiary contract, the beneficiary must join the stipulator in a suit by the beneficiary
against the promisor to enforce the stipulation pour autrut).
74. La. R.S. 13:4231, as amended by 1984 La. Acts, No. 331, § 7.
75. NA 1982.
76. 9 La. Ann. 195 (1854).
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invalidate the contract would nullify the stipulation and defeat the
beneficiary's action.
Defenses available to the promisor when performance is demanded of
him by either the stipulator or the beneficiary may include: personal
incapacity, vices of consent, improper contractual fdrm (when required),
nullity, and non-performance by the stipulator. 77
Conclusion
The law of third-party-beneficiary contracts has been clarified to a
certain extent by the 1984 revision. The articles are clear, concise, and
informative and will be of great help to the attorney who deals with
these contracts only infrequently. There have been a few minor changes,
but they will have little impact on everyday practice. The 1984 revision
should make drafting third-party-beneficiary contracts and dealing with
their problems much easier. Since parties will be more aware of their
rights and obligations under these contracts, the number of disputes
arising from them should decrease.
It is unfortunate that the legislature was not informed of these
changes through the comments to the articles. 78 Such negligence does little
to foster trust and cooperation between the legislative and academic
communities. Also, this failure of explanation presents the courts with
a dilemma in applying the new articles: the legislative intent conflicts
with the drafters' intent. The legislature, relying on the comments that
the articles do not change the law, voted for the articles thinking (and
intending) that they would not change the law. But the drafters nec-
essarily intended certain changes. 79 The courts will have to apply the
clear wording of the articles, but if a case is presented that must be
decided based on the intent of the articles, the court should deny any
interpretation that would be a change from prior jurisprudence. The
legislative intent, based on what the legislature was told about these
articles, should control over the drafters' intent when a conflict exists
between the two.
Fred McGaha
77. 2 M. Planiol, supra note 20, pt. 1, no. 1264.
78. The comments to each article dealing with third-party-beneficiary contracts declare
that the articles do not change the law.
79. See Obligations Revision-Third Party Beneficiary Proposal, Meeting of the Ad-
visory Committee, Art. I, Reporter's Note (Apr. 20, 1979) (on file with Louisiana State
Law Institute, Paul M. Hebert Law Center, Baton Rouge, Louisiana).
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